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ABSTRACT  
Developer paid fees or charges are a commonly used mechanism for local governments to pay for new infrastructure. 
However, property developers claim that these costs are merely passed on to home buyers, with adverse effects to 
housing affordability. Despite numerous government reports and many years of industry advocacy, there remains no 
empirical evidence in Australia to confirm or quantify this passing on effect to home buyers. Hence there remains no 
data from which governments can base policy decision on, and the debate continues.  
This paper examines the question of the impact of infrastructure charges on housing affordability in Australia. It 
presents the findings of a hedonic house price model that provides the first empirical evidence that infrastructure 
charges do increase house prices in Australia.  This research is consistent with international findings, that support the 
proposition that developer paid infrastructure charges are passed on to home buyers and are a significant contributor 
to increasing house prices and reduced housing affordability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Housing is widely touted as the largest investment most Australians make in their lifetime, however despite all levels of 
government having housing affordability policies, housing affordability remains at critical levels (Demographia, 2013).  
At the same time, the provision of new urban infrastructure in growing communities has been a policy dilemma for 
governments since the 1950s (Neutze, 1995).  On one hand, governments may appease existing residents by shifting the 
responsibility of funding new growth related infrastructure from the government to the development industry (Burge, 
2008) ; however on the other hand, the passing-on of these costs to new homeowners is said to directly contribute to 
reduced housing affordability (Been, 2005).   
There is an extensive body of international literature that discusses the passing on (to home buyers) or passing back (to 
the englobo land seller) of infrastructure charges (Nelson et.al 2008).  Regardless of the direction of passing and the 
various market elasticities, in the long term the outcome appears inevitable that house prices rise as a result of 
infrastructure charges (Been, 2005)(Been, 2005).  The question that remains in debate is:  how much do infrastructure 
charges increase house prices by?  In a climate where housing affordability is a policy objective for many governments 
(Queensland Government, 2007)(Queensland Government, 2007) a clear understanding of the impacts these 
government charges have on the price and supply of new housing is imperative.  Despite over a dozen separate studies 
over two decades in the US on this topic, no empirical works have been carried out in Australia to test if similar shifting 
or overshifting occurs here.  This research seeks to close that knowledge gap through hedonic modelling of 
infrastructure charges and house prices using data from Brisbane, Queensland.  This issue is important because the 
Queensland State Government has dual policies of housing affordability and growth management (Queensland 
Government, 2009), however to date there has been no evidence of the impact of one on the other.   
The term “Infrastructure Charges” is a term that is used to encompass the estimated proportionate cost of providing 
trunk and other off-site urban infrastructure such as local roads, stormwater and community facilities and parks to new 
developments.  It is a one off charge levied on the developer, generally at the time of rezoning/planning approval 
(Bryant & Eves, 2014) (Been, 2005, Burge, 2008, Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003). 
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These costs historically were born by the public purse, however in high growth areas, governments have been 
increasingly reluctant to fund such infrastructure through general revenue (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003). Existing 
home owners resist paying higher rates and taxes to fund new development.  Hence infrastructure charges were 
introduced to shift these costs to the private sector (Burge, 2005).  Around the globe, various terminologies are used to 
describe what are essentially urban infrastructure funding mechanisms.  For example, the term “Impact Fees” is used 
throughout the majority of the US, “Development Charges” is prominent in Canada, “Planning obligation”, “planning 
gain” or “Section 106 agreements” are all terms used today to describe the equivalent to an infrastructure charging 
system in the UK (Evans, 2004). “Exactions” is a general term used in Indian (3iNetwork) and some American 
literature, whilst in Australia “Infrastructure Charges”, “Developer Contributions” or “Development Levies” are largely 
interchangeable terms depending on the jurisdiction.   
This introductory section sets the background for this topic.  The following section details the relevant literature, whilst 
the third section outlines the methodology used for this research.  The forth section presents the data, with the results to 
follow, and the last section concludes. 
 
LITERATURE 
Internationally, the issue of infrastructure charges and the impact on housing prices is widely documented.  
Infrastructure charges were originally intended to transfer the burden of infrastructure provision in high growth areas 
from the public purse on to developers (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003).  However, in a competitive market, and 
subject to the various prevailing market elasticities, the theoretical literature is consistent in its conclusions that despite 
market conditions (i.e. relative market elasticities) infrastructure charges are passed onto home buyers in the long run 
and will thus lead to increased housing prices (Been, 2005, Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003, Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004, Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006).   
This theoretical concept is consistently captured by a vast number of academics, particularly in the US and Canada over 
the past three decades.  With supporting theoretical literature dating back to the 1970’s, current international literature 
now largely assumes it as a given that infrastructure charges increase the price of new housing in the long run 
(Productivity Commission, 2011). 
If the theoretical work is largely consistent in its conclusions that infrastructure charges lead to increased housing 
prices, the next question that follows is:  how much do house prices increase by?  In the US, there is a well established 
body of empirical research that has evolved from this theoretical evidence on the cost impact of infrastructure charges 
on new housing over the past 35+ years (Been, 2005, Nelson et.al 2008).  Review of this literature reveals however, it is 
a danger to assume that passing, or shifting of costs is at parity (ie. $1.00 extra for infrastructure charges = $1.00 passed 
on or back).  The US research indicates that it is common for “over shifting” to occur, with home buyers paying a 
greater incremental increase in the cost of the new home (as compared to the cost of the infrastructure charge) as 
developers seek compensation for the additional risk taken and return on costs (Campbell, 2004, Mathur et al., 2004, 
Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004).   
It is evident that whilst the findings of the empirical research to date are consistent in quantifying a consistent 
“overshifting” of infrastructure charges to housing prices, the methodologies used vary greatly, as does the extent of 
overshifting identified.  In these studies, a $1.00 infrastructure charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a 
$0.13 for the developed lot only (Evans-Cowley et al., 2005), $0.23 increase in new house price (Dresch and Sheffrin 
1997) and up to $3.58 increase in new house price (Singell & Lillydahl, 1990).  With the evolution of better specified 
models, the research in the last decade from the US indicates that for every $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges, new 
housing costs increase $1.50 to $1.70 (Nelson et.al 2008).  This concept of “over shifting” for housing is consistent 
across all of the empirical research dating back to the 1980’s.   
Until now, this debate has gone largely unanswered in Australia by the academic community.  Recently Gurran and 
colleagues considered the issue of planning costs and housing affordability from a broader qualitative perspective using 
case studies (Gurran et al., 2009, Ruming et al., 2011, Gurran et al., 2010, Gurran et al., 2008).  These examine the 
impact of all government charges and planning regulations on housing costs in each of the three eastern seaboard States.  
Amongst other findings, this research limits its findings on the impact of infrastructure charges to concluding that all 
planning charges have increased at a greater and disproportionate rate to median house prices, however no empirical 
evidence of the direct impact of infrastructure charges on house price increases is provided. 
The absence of empirical data on this house price effect is fuelling the debate in Australia as to whether infrastructure 
charges do get passed on to home buyers or not.  This is a significant gap in the Australian research, and this paper 
seeks to provide the first empirical study of its kind in Australia to address this gap.   
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METHODOLOGY 
Hedonic price models based on multiple regression theory dates back to Waugh in 1928 with other early contributions 
by Court in 1939 and Stone in 1954 (Hill et al, 1997).  However, it is since the seminal work of Griliches in 1971 and 
Rosen in 1974 (Meese and Wallace, 2003) that hedonic methods started to receive attention.  These models provide for 
differentiation of individual supply and demand attributes (vectors of characteristics whose prices are not independently 
observed) whilst controlling for heterogeneous characteristics that are commonly thought to contribute to house price 
such as location, neighbourhood, age, number of bedrooms and the like (Dougherty, 2011); Hill 2012) .   
Review of the empirical models used internationally to estimate the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices 
suggests that the use of an ordinary least squares (OLS) hedonic regression model is appropriate for this study.  The 
hedonic approach is a relatively straightforward method once the requisite data is acquired and transformed into the 
appropriate scale and format.  The relative simplicity of the hedonic approach is one of its strengths and hence why it 
has been in use since Rosen’s (1974) seminary work. Despite the various functional forms employed in the literature, a 
simple linear reduced form equation may be equally appropriate Delaney and Smith (1989), and is the adopted form for 
this study.  In building the model, a step-wise approach was adopted to test the theory of additional variables adding 
greater predictive qualities to the model.  Structural elements were regressed initially, with locational elements added in 
a second step, then the jurisdictional and (government) policy elements added in the final step.  The final model is 
indicated below: 
 
 Equ. 1 
Where   
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the house: lot area; number of bedrooms, bathrooms and car parking spaces, 
dummy for new or existing home  
Li =  Locational features of the house:  region and socio-economic suburb rankings 
Ji = Jurisdictional factors that might affect the price of a house: changes to household income levels; 
population growth; new housing supply; unemployment rate; construction cost index;  mortgage rates;  
consumer confidence 
Gi = Government policy factors that might affect the price of the house: infrastructure charges, First Home 
Owners Grant  
 =  error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
 
DATA 
This study examines the effect of infrastructure charges on houses and developed residential lots in Brisbane, 
Queensland, Australia.  Brisbane is the State capital of Queensland and is the hub of South-East Queensland which is 
Australia’s third largest metropolitan region, comprising 3.1 million people, of which approximately 70% reside in the 
Greater Brisbane area, accounting for approximately half of the State’s population (ABS, 2012).  New development 
stretches along the major transportation routes to the north and south of the central business district and to a lesser 
extent the east and west due to geographical constraints.  The data used for this study includes a sample of suburbs in 
Brisbane’s northern growth corridor as well as the same in Brisbane’s southern growth corridor.  The study period for 
this research is from 2005 to 2011.   
Full sales record data for all houses and vacant residential lots for the period 2005 to 2011 in the local government areas 
in this study was provided by Price Finder, a commercial re-seller of the state and local government sales records.  This 
provided the structural data including:  address, real property description, lot size, sale price, sale date (contract date), 
settlement date, number of bedrooms/bathrooms/carparks, zoning, sale type, land use, buyer and seller details.  Sales 
data was cleansed to remove:  non arms length transactions, part sales, multiple transaction sales, and court order 
transactions.  Bedroom, bathroom and carpark data was missing for approximately one third of the data set.   The sales 
with incomplete data were removed.  Data on the size of the house and the age of the house were not available.  
Next locational data was considered. The data set supplied full address details for each sales record however, no GIS 
data was available.  In order to take factors such as some suburbs in the study areas being more or less desirable than 
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others into consideration the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (“ABS”) “Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage 
and Disadvantage” (IRSAD) was utilised.  This index provides a 1 – 10 rating at a suburb level as a relative measure of 
socio-economic advantage and disadvantage.   
Jurisdictional data was sourced from the ABS web site, with the exception of data on the 30 year home mortgage rates, 
consumer sentiment and inflation, which was sourced from the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) web site.  Where 
monthly or quarterly data existed, annual averages were derived (by calendar year).   Data on common supply and 
demand house price drivers were sought at a local government level (rather than State level) to ensure regional sub-
market effects were suitably accommodated.  The local government area of “Brisbane” was used for the southside data 
set, and “Moreton Bay” used for the northside data set, with both being part of the Greater Brisbane metropolitan area.  
The two government policy variables that are relevant to house prices over the study period are infrastructure charges 
and the First Home Owners Grant.   Infrastructure charge data is not readily available in Queensland and has been a 
limiting factor in the progression of this type of research.  In order to access such data, large private land developers 
were approached to supply infrastructure charge data for their projects.  The developers that were approached supplied 
data on the infrastructure charges levied on their projects in the study area.  The total infrastructure charges applicable 
to a stage were divided by the number of lots in that stage to determine the charge per lot.  The applicable rate per 
annum was derived from the year the stage was released and sold and adopted as the average infrastructure charge 
applicable in the study area.  A one year lag was applied to account for the time between development approval and 
completion of the project.    
The First Home Owners Grant (“FHOG”) and other associated government initiatives are an important feature of the 
Australian housing market due to their stimulatory objectives.  The study period of 2005 to 2011 incorporates the strong 
market in the lead up to the GFC and the post GFC market retraction.  For the purposes of this analysis, a FHOG 
dummy variable has been introduced:  0 if net assistance is in the normal range or 1 if stimulatory policy is in place ie 
2009 for both new and existing homes, and 2011 for new homes only.   
The final data set for this study comprised of a total of 29,752 house sales in Brisbane from 2005 to 2011..   Table 11 
describes the independent variables utilised in the model estimation.   Table 2 indicates the summary statistics.  
 
Table 1  Variable Legend 
Variable Definition 
Structural Attributes  
SQM Lot size in square metres 
BEDS Total number of bedrooms 
BATHS Total number of bathrooms 
CARS Total number of car parking spaces 
TYPE Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Existing (0) or New (1)
  
Locational Attributes  
REGION Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Brisbane Northside (0) or Southside (1)
IRSAD 1-10  ranking of suburb as indicated by the Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage 
  
Jurisdictional  
YEAR Time variable for year of sale 
POPRATE Percentage rate of change in population (LGA*)
INCOME Percentage increase in median household income (LGA*)
BDLG Percentage change in building approvals  (LGA*)
UNEMP Unemployment rate (LGA*) 
CONSTN Percentage change in construction cost index for Brisbane (capital city)
MTGE Average 30 year mortgage rate (Australia)
CONSS Consumer sentiment index (Australia)
  
Policy Attributes  
IC Annual infrastructure charge adopted on a per lot basis, based on year of sale of lot.
FHOG Dummy variable indicating whether the sale occurred in a year with a high FHOG (1 in 2009 for new and existing, 1 in 2011 for
new only) or normal FHOG (0) 
*LGA = data obtained at a local government area level 
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Table 2  Summary Statistics –Houses   
Variable Mean Std Dev 
PRICE 471,863.63 148,510.16 
SQM 687.58 333.59 
BEDS 3.63 0.77 
BATHS 1.78 0.65 
CARS 1.93 0.74 
TYPE 0.16 0.37 
REGION 0.47 0.50 
IRSAD 7.26 2.48 
YEAR 2007.61 1.72 
POPRATE 2.77 0.69 
INCOME 4.99 1.49 
BDLG - 4.70 16.68 
UNEMP 3.59 1.00 
CONSTN 4.23 2.66 
MTGE 7.56 0.93 
CONSS 105.29 8.48 
IC 12,080.79 4,536.60 
FHOG 0.21 0.41 
n 29,752  
 
Step-Wise Process 
A step-wise approach was adopted to test the additional predictive value of the model upon the inclusion of more 
independent variables.  The structural elements were regressed initially, with locational elements added in a second 
step, then the jurisdictional and (government) policy elements added in the final step.  The results of the process using 
Brisbane house data are indicated in Table 3 below. 
Table 3   Step Wise Process Model Summaryd 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change  Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F change
1 .683a .467 .467 108443.541 .467 5210.088 5 29746 .000 
2 .743b .552 .552 99457.403 .085 1873.676 3 29743 .000 
3 .756c .572 .572 97182.892 .020 157.503 9 29734 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SQM, BEDS, BATHS, CARS, TYPE (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SQM, BEDS, BATHS, CARS, TYPE, YEAR, REGION, IRSAD (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), SQM, BEDS, BATHS, CARS, TYPE, YEAR, REGION, IRSAD, YEAR, POPRATE, INCOME, BDLG, UNEMP, 
CONSTN, MTGE, CONSS, IC FHOG (Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  PRICE 
 
These findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the house price model improve as the additional independent 
variables are added, as would be expected, albeit with diminishing returns. 
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RESULTS 
The regression results for the pooled data set for Brisbane houses are provided in Table 4.  All outputs are of the 
expected sign and significance with the exception of building approvals.   These results indicate that a $1.00 increase in 
infrastructure charges (IC) increases house prices in Brisbane by $3.69 at a 95% confidence interval, or an on-passing 
ratio of 369%.   
Table 4  Regression Results – Brisbane Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig.  Lower Bound*  Upper Bound*  
1 (Constant)           71,170.13  22.12 0.000           64,863.91            77,476.36  
  SQM                 141.86  71.42 0.000                 137.96                  145.75  
  BEDS           32,808.21  30.77 0.000           30,718.64            34,897.78  
  BATHS           89,582.08  70.09 0.000           87,076.92            92,087.24  
  CARS             9,939.19  10.96 0.000             8,161.72            11,716.66  
  TYPE           34,338.84  19.10 0.000           30,814.85            37,862.83  
2 (Constant) - 31,193,538.82  -44.50 0.000 - 32,567,566.00  - 29,819,511.64  
  SQM                 148.57  80.74 0.000                 144.97                  152.18  
  BEDS           26,844.01  27.34 0.000           24,919.59            28,768.42  
  BATHS           71,547.33  59.31 0.000           69,182.82            73,911.85  
  CARS           10,266.89  12.30 0.000             8,630.17            11,903.61  
  TYPE           32,969.58  19.74 0.000           29,695.31            36,243.84  
  REGION           14,290.00  56.07 0.000           13,790.49            14,789.50  
  IRSAD           48,922.20  39.26 0.000           46,479.67            51,364.72  
  YEAR           15,534.33  44.49 0.000           14,849.90            16,218.75  
3 (Constant) - 17,258,177.32  -5.19 0.000 - 23,771,671.58  - 10,744,683.06  
  SQM                 147.23  81.82 0.000                 143.70                  150.75  
  BEDS           26,535.98  27.66 0.000           24,655.23            28,416.74  
  BATHS           71,786.83  60.89 0.000           69,475.97            74,097.69  
  CARS           10,552.51  12.93 0.000             8,952.63            12,152.39  
  TYPE           33,272.01  19.90 0.000           29,994.77            36,549.25  
  REGION           14,389.73  57.78 0.000           13,901.55            14,877.90  
  IRSAD           61,628.69  7.53 0.000           45,578.94            77,678.44  
  YEAR             8,808.39  5.33 0.000             5,570.39            12,046.39  
  POPRATE           11,943.88  2.21 0.027             1,327.70            22,560.06  
  INCOME             4,361.34  2.24 0.025                 552.13              8,170.55  
  BDLG           -   410.24  -1.43 0.152            -   971.35                  150.86  
  UNEMP        -  23,543.13  -3.02 0.003       -   38,841.35           -  8,244.90  
  CONSTN           11,472.42  5.55 0.000             7,422.94            15,521.89  
  MTGE          - 57,728.68  -6.70 0.000        -  74,626.85          - 40,830.51  
  CONSS               - 576.21  -1.67 0.095         -   1,251.75                    99.34  
  IC                     3.69  6.89 0.000                     2.64                      4.74  
  FHOG            - 30,893.77  -5.03 0.000       -   42,944.69         -  18,842.86  
*95.0% Confidence Interval for Beta 
 
FINDINGS 
This study provides the first empirical evidence that infrastructure charges, after accounting for macroeconomic 
conditions and other factors that influence housing price, contribute to increases in the price of houses in Brisbane, 
Queensland during the period of 2005 to 2011.  This evidence supports the theory that despite infrastructure charges 
being levied on property developers, these supply chain costs are passed onto the end home buyer.  Not only are these 
fees being passed onto consumers, they are being significantly over passed in the order of 369%.   
Various reasons for overpassing have been hypothesised in the literature, however no studies have provided evidence in 
this regard.  A common proposition for the over shifting phenomenon is the suggestion that infrastructure charges add 
additional uncertainties and delay costs in the approval process, resulting in developers recouping more than the cost of 
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the fees alone as developers seek compensation for the additional risk taken and return on costs (Campbell, 2004, 
Mathur, 2003).  This overshifting can also be combined with back passing to land owners (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004), with developers requiring higher profit margins to compensate them for the additional uncertainty associated 
with a rapidly changing regulatory environment.  Further, any additional development costs are increased by 
construction period interest and other development costs determined as a percentage of the sale price (Singell and 
Lillydahl 1990; Crowe 2007).  So not only are infrastructure charges passed directly onto homeowners, there is an 
overshifting effect to compensate developers firstly for the additional uncertainty (risk) and secondly a return of funds 
invested component, either for the developer, or its financier over the development period (Elickson and Been, 2005).   
Whilst this explanation appears intuitive and in line with common thinking, there are others within who argue the 
opposite, suggesting that infrastructure charges increase certainty.  Nelson et al (1992) supported by Nelson et al. 
(2008) contend that infrastructure charges reduce uncertainty by virtue of timely provision of public infrastructure, that 
may expand the supply of buildable land.  In their Australian review, Gurran et al (2009) suggest that the negotiated 
approach in the UK reduces risks for developers.  This seems counter intuitive, with any unknown in the costing process 
adding uncertainty for developers.  This is further compounded by the unpredictable delays (and costs) incurred in the 
negotiation process (Bramley & Leishman, 2005; Chan et al., 2009).   
The high on-passing ratio evident in this study could be a function of the uncertainty associated with the fully 
negotiated and rapidly increasing opaque infrastructure charging regime in Queensland at the time.  In the US studies, 
set fees per lot were scheduled with annual increases announced in advance.  Theory suggests that in a fully transparent 
system, such supply chain costs are able to be passed back to the land owner, and yet overpassing at a consistent level 
existed in all US studies undertaken.  Indeed Shaughnessy’s (2003) study on land price impacts suggested that back-
passing and over-passing were occurring contemporaneously, albeit with weak evidence.     
 
CONCLUSION 
Housing affordability is at critical levels in Australia and the reasons for this are the subject of much policy debate.  
Despite a significant body of research on the incidence of infrastructure charges on new house prices in the US, there 
has been very limited academic progress in Australia on infrastructure charges’ contribution to house prices.  In a 
climate where housing affordability is a policy objective for many governments, a clear understanding of the impacts 
these government charges have on the price and supply of new housing is imperative.   
Development industry bodies maintain that infrastructure charges are a significant contributor to the supply-side drivers 
of increasing house prices.  Over three decades of theoretical literature from North America is found to be consistent in 
its findings that infrastructure charges increase the price of housing.  However the empirical work is somewhat 
inconsistent in its conclusions as to how much house prices are increased by.  The reasons for these price impacts are 
also still under debate.    
To date the Australian academic community has not responded to this issue in an empirical manner.  This research 
provides the first empirical evidence of the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia.  This research 
provides strong evidence in support of the proposition that not only are infrastructure charges passed on to home buyers, 
they are over-passed by 369%.  These results will inform governments on the outcomes of their growth management 
strategies on housing affordability, providing the first evidence of its kind in Australia.  
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